The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994: The astonishing success of a weak non-binding policy
Gill, Derek | November 2018
Abstract
This paper discusses how New Zealand already has a highly independent fiscal institution in the Treasury. A more limited case can be made for an institution to support the opposition in costing policy proposals as occurs in Australia with the Parliamentary Budget Office. The unexpected success of the FRA highlights how difficult it will be to create the conditions for another independent budget office to succeed in New Zealand.
Citation
Gill, Derek. 2018. The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994: The astonishing success of a weak non-binding policy. © New Zealand Institute of Economic Research. http://hdl.handle.net/11540/9522.ISSN
1176-4384
Keywords
Financial Stability
Financial Management System
Financial Restructuring
Capital Market Development
Market Development
Economics
Erosion
International Economics
Macroeconomic
Macroeconomic Analysis
Performance Evaluation
Impact Evaluation
Foreign and Domestic Financing
Foreign Direct Investment
International Financial Market
Multilateral Financial Institutions
Economic Recession
Market
Crisis
Economic indicators
Growth models
Gross domestic product
Macroeconomics
Economic forecast
Business Financing
Investment Requirements
Labor policy
Manpower policy
Business recessions
Multilateral development banks
Regulatory reform
Capital
Exports
Economic development projects
Economic policy
Economic forecasting
Investment Requirements
Banks
International banks and banking
Capital movements
Central banks and banking
Bills of exchange
Swaps
Banks and banking
Financial crisis
Credit control
Credit allocation
Capital market
International liquidity
Liquidity
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