CONTENTS

List of figures ix
List of tables xi
Contributors xiv
Preface xvi

South Asia–Gulf migration corridor: an introduction 1
S. IRUDAYA RAJAN

1 Migration, transnational flows and development in India: a regional perspective 19
CAROL UPADHYA AND MARIO RUTTEN

2 The influence of vulnerability on migration intentions in Afghanistan 49
CRAIG LOSCHMANN AND MELISSA SIEGEL

3 Brains, capital, charity, soft power: the skilled South Asian diaspora in developed countries 77
RUPA CHANDA

4 South Asia-Gulf migratory corridor: emerging patterns, prospects and challenges 120
GINU ZACHARIA OOMMEN
CONTENTS

5 Challenges of labour recruitment for overseas employment: the Bangladesh experience 147
C. R. ABRAR AND M. MOTASIM BILLAH

6 Making migration free: an analysis of Nepal’s ‘free-visa, free-ticket’ scheme 164
BANDITA SIJAPATI, MOHD AYUB AND HIMALAYA KHAREL

7 Estimating the impact of international remittance on households expenditure in Bangladesh 190
SELIM RAIHAN, TASNEEM SIDDQUI AND RAISUL A. MAHMOOD

8 Intra-household dynamics of remittance practices: a case study of Bangladesh 209
SYEDA ROZANA RASHID AND MOHAMMAD JALAL UDDIN SIKDER

9 Migration in the global recession and in its recovery in Sri Lanka 230
MYRTLE PERERA

10 Returning home: challenges of reintegration 267
SUWENDRANI JAYARATNE, NIPUNI PERERA, NELUKA GUNASEKARA AND NISHA ARUNATILAKE

11 Labour emigration and emigration policies in Nepal: a political-economic analysis 292
JAGANNATH ADHIKARI

12 Internal migration and labour mobility in Pakistan 321
SADIA ISHFAQ, VAQAR AHMED, DANISH HASSAN AND ASIF JAVED

Index 343
Internal migration and labour mobility is now increasingly being studied through the lens of human security. Global estimates suggest that 740 million people around the world are internal migrants (UNOCHA 2010). Given its large number, especially within developing countries, internal migration has the economic potential to contribute positively towards greater human security and development objectives falling under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework. As compared to international migration, internal migration involves a workforce four times larger (Qin et al. 2014) that hails from poorer backgrounds and remits money to a wider number of poor families (Deshingkar and Grimm 2004). It also provides migrant households opportunities to advance human security outcomes by moving to a location that promises improved access to education, health and employment opportunities.

In developing countries, like Pakistan, internal migration drives economic growth in key sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services. If utilised effectively as a policy tool, internal migration can reduce income inequalities and wage differentials. Regrettably, however, internal migration has been glossed over in national policymaking of Pakistan (Hisam 2014) due to limited understanding of its economic potential.

The country’s National Emigration Policy (Government of Pakistan 2009) and the now defunct Labour Policy (Government of Pakistan 2010) are quite unsatisfactory in this regard. The National Emigration Policy discusses international migration issues exclusively, with no focus on internal migration. On similar lines, the Labour Policy does make a fleeting
reference to external migration (emigration), it makes no reference to internal migration. Moreover, while poverty and development disparity do seem to influence internal migration patterns, the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the recently approved Vision 2025 fail to provide meaningful measures to harness potential of internal labour mobility.

This policy and planning lacuna is paralleled by a dearth of legislation related to rights of internal migrants in Pakistan. As a result, the government is insufficiently prepared to manage the challenges and opportunities that internal migration presents. With limited legal protection and security from the relevant state bodies, most internal migrants in Pakistan face multiple human security threats. As happens elsewhere in the developing world, internal migrants are exposed to human security risks that include exposure to illness, disease and food insecurity, socio-cultural exclusion, lack of personal security and economic discrimination, among others (UNOCHA 2013). In order to remove migrants from such human security threats that are rooted in their places of destination (and origin), it is important to understand why people are migrating in the first place.

Taking lead from Farwick (2009), our objective in this chapter is to update the knowledge on Pakistan and try to answer:

a  Who are the people currently on the move?
b  What is their motivation to move from their origin?
c  How are they received at the destination?

In the case of points a and b, we have some secondary data to guide us. However, in the case of point c, we aim to use a qualitative approach to identify and ask relevant respondents and ‘receiving communities’ how internal migrants are able to settle themselves at the destination. We are particularly interested in how inclusive and participatory is the community and job market at the destination.

The next section provides a brief literature review from a global perspective, followed by a section where we provide Pakistan-specific work on internal migration. Following a brief discussion on our methodology, we move to the findings from our qualitative exercise. We conclude with policy recommendations for federal and provincial governments in Pakistan. We also explain that there is an important role for civil society organisations to step up their social accountability efforts so that the various inequalities faced by the migrant population can be mitigated.
Global perspectives on internal migration

International literature on migration suggests that historically humans have migrated for multiple and complex reasons. Some migrated for economic security to escape poverty or to seek better economic opportunities. Others migrate by compulsion to escape conflict, war, human right violations or discrimination (UNOCHA 2013). Still others migrate in response to changes in local environmental conditions that indirectly erode their livelihoods and security (Foresight 2011).

Correspondingly, academics have come up with a number of economic and sociological theories, since the pioneer work of Ravenstein (1885) to theoretically explain why humans migrate. The seminal work of Lewis (1954), Ranis and Fei (1961) and Harris and Todaro (1970) was influential in shaping the neoclassical economics theory that considered labour market as the key determining factor in influencing migratory decisions. It perceived migration decisions to be taken in response to wage differentials. The NELM that was spearheaded by works of Stark and Taylor in the 1980s postulated that humans migrated in response to a variety of market variables, and not just income and employment differences, so as to minimise risks to household incomes.

Piore (1979) framed migration in the dual labour market theory, according to which migration was driven by ‘pull factors’ in destination areas that were inherent in institutional structures of industrialised regions. The world systems theory of the late 1980s and early 1990s explained migratory moves in the light of economic liberalisation that was perceived to facilitate labour flow across different markets. A common feature of all these approaches was that they presumed that migratory decisions were primarily motivated by economic factors where market played the fundamental role.

In later years, new schools of thought emerged out of development practice which placed humans, rather than markets, at the centre of development. An important one within this stream was the human security framework that became acclaimed by the ex-Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan.

The human security framework is a people-centred approach that twins the concepts of development and security. According to the framework, threats to human security generally stem from underlying structural failures, such as underinvestment in basic amenities and public services (Tadjbakhsh 2005). Chronic poverty, underemployment, inequality, lawlessness, conflict and politico-economic instability are perceived as threats to human development (Tadjbakhsh 2005), which can set off changes in
local population in the form of mass displacement and permanent migration. Thus, lack of access to social, political and economic opportunities may contribute to migration (Scribner and Vietti 2013).

Framing migration in such a perspective helps identify the socio-political, economic and security implications of migration, which in the long run can help balance both national security and human security needs by promoting benefits generated from migration (UNOCHA 2013). It also offers interesting insights on how discrepancies in human security may lead to demographic and economic challenges and opportunities in a developing country like Pakistan.

**Perspectives from Pakistan**

Pakistan is home to the world’s 10th largest labour force, with an estimated population of 191.7 million (Pakistan Economic Survey 2013–14). A bulk of the country’s demographic dividend is in the economically active age of 15–64 years. National economic growth, while slow in the past few years, has been unevenly distributed across the rural and urban areas. The urban economy that is home to 38 per cent of the population generates 78 per cent of the national income; contrastingly, the rural economy produces one-fifth of national GDP, even though they house a majority (62%) of the population. Similarly, social infrastructure investment is disproportionately concentrated in or around metropolitans, while rural communities receive inadequate development spending (Ahmed 2015; Burki et al. 2015; Naveed and Ali 2012).

Dividends of economic growth have also been unequally distributed across the provinces, as is evident from interprovincial differences in economic growth. Unofficial statistics approximate provincial economy of the Punjab to contribute about 50 per cent to the national income, followed by Sindh (30%), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (10%) and Balochistan (10%) (WB 2014). As regards rural and urban areas, the development differential between and within provinces is marked by unequal access to schooling, healthcare and employment opportunities (WB 2014), which has, to some extent, contributed to internal migration.

With a few exceptions, formal employment in major sectors has steadily increased. Employment trends (Table 12.1) across provinces indicate that Balochistan has the greatest share of people formally engaged in agriculture. Sindh leads the employment share in the trade sector, closely followed by the Punjab.

In recent years, unemployment has increased from 5.6 per cent in 2010 to 6.2 per cent in 2013 (Figure 12.1); almost 9 per cent of urban
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</thead>
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<td>36.2</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/social and personal service</td>
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<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics.
employable labour force is looking for job compared to 5 per cent in rural areas (PBS 2013). On the contrary, wage rates are higher in urban areas. Overall, the labour market is more positive for labour classes in Punjab and large agglomerations such as Karachi. Most non-farm workers in rural areas sustain on less than average income (Ahmed et al. 2010). The compliance with minimum wage laws is also weak. Rural female labour force is mostly engaged in the agriculture sector, where they receive minimal income or in-kind reward. In terms of labour productivity, national and provincial trends indicate that Sindh is the most richly endowed with productive labour, followed by KPK, Punjab and Balochistan (WB 2014).

During growth spurms, both rural and urban workforce tends to migrate from ‘low-productivity jobs in agriculture’ to more productive non-farm-based jobs, such as in manufacturing, construction and services sectors (WB 2014). The diversification in labour market is paralleled by the rise in internal migration, both interprovincial and rural-urban (WB 2014).

The country has seen high levels of internal migration in recent decades. While many migrate temporarily or permanently to escape internal conflict, politico-economic instability and natural disasters, economic migration is also significant in Pakistan. According to Memon (2005), economic migrants make up to 20 per cent of total migration in the country. An in-depth analysis of this, however, has received limited attention in academic circles, given the inadequacy of national mobility data.

National migration literature suggests that historically migration has been associated with differential in poverty, labour productivity, employment
opportunities, human development and rural-urban development (Ahmed et al. 2010; Irfan 1986; Khan and Shenaz 2000; Mahmud et al. 2010; Memon 2005; Mazumdar 1987). While emerging research also focusses on the links between migratory decisions and socio-political instability, conflict and environmental change (Hasan 2009; Saeed et al. 2015; SLRC/SDPI study 2014), most literature on internal migration is concentrated around the incidence, flow and economic drivers of migration (Arif 2005). Few studies capture the impact of migration on socio-economic well-being at the macro (economy-wide) and micro (household) scale (Arif 2005).

Irfan (1986) estimated that 42 per cent of total migrants in Pakistan moved within districts, 39 per cent across districts and 19 per cent across provincial boundaries. Arif (2005) came up with similar findings two decades later, claiming that rural to urban migration makes up 40 per cent of total internal migration in Pakistan. More recently, Mahmud et al. (2010) calculated rural-urban migration to account for 32 per cent of total internal migration. They found that, provincially, rural-urban migration is lowest in Sindh and Balochistan followed by Punjab and KP (Mahmud et al. 2010). Remarkably, a majority of rural migrants tend to move towards districts having a high level of population densities. For example, 63 per cent of the people who migrated in the last 10 years moved to an urban area, with 56 per cent moving to the provincial or the federal capital (Mahmud et al. 2010), mainly due to family networks and higher concentrated development in these areas. Similarly, Hussain (2014) estimates that net rural-urban migration accounts for one-fifth of the rise in urban population.

In a more focussed internal migration study carried out in Faisalabad district, Farooq and Cheema (2005) found that 80 per cent and 13 per cent of the respondents were ‘pushed’ out due to poor economic and educational opportunities, respectively. Likewise, Oda (2005) found that a sizeable population in Chakwal district migrated internally as a household coping strategy to adapt to variability in agriculture-based incomes. Many were compelled to migrate, as they lacked alternative economic opportunities in their place of origin. This is in line with the longitudinal study of deBrauw et al. (2013), who concluded that poorer families are more prone to diversify away from farm-based jobs following environmental shocks. They found that the magnitude and statistical significance of migrants from rural to urban is most pronounced for the land and asset poor people, who included not only those who were directly associated with agriculture, but also those who generated incomes by providing goods and services to land owners.

Pakistan’s internal migrants who cross administrative (provincial or district) boundaries in search of better living, contribute substantially to the
manufacturing, construction and services sectors. Similar to the international migrant stream, a large proportion of the migrant community possess limited education and takes up low-paying jobs in new settlements (PILDAT 2008 in SLRC/SDPI report 2014). Given their limited socio-economic resources, the most preferred destinations of such migrants are slums and informal settlements around peri-urban and urban areas, where they are exposed to new vulnerabilities and insecurities (Arif 2005; Saeed et al. 2015). Seasonal or cyclic migrants, who migrate temporarily, come from arid areas where farming and livestock rearing is a primary economic activity; they seasonally migrate during the dry season in order to diversify and add to family incomes. Most of them belong to poor backgrounds and are generally asset poor (deBrauw et al. 2013).

While national data are limited, it is assumed that internal migrant labour contributes far more significantly than international migrants. International remittances from overseas Pakistan account for as much as 5 per cent of the national GDP (Government of Pakistan 2014), making Pakistan one of the highest remittance-receiving countries in Asia. However, economic valuation of internal remittances transfer is not well documented.

Given the definitional issues and the dearth of reliable and consistent official data on internal mobility, migration flows are difficult to calculate without substantial error (Irfan 1986; Mahmud et al. 2010). Not surprisingly, there are only a few recent studies that reliably focus on labour mobility levels in Pakistan.

Methodology

Given the dearth of data on internal mobility, we first present a brief descriptive analysis based on the past two LFS data sets. These data provide information on overall national-level internal migration, rural–urban and urban–rural migration, intra-provincial and interprovincial migration, flow of migration by employment status and number of hours worked. Taking stock of these data also allows us to carefully assess the lacunas in current information on internal mobility.

The LFS is published by the government’s Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. The survey is based on data collected from more than 40,000 households across urban and rural areas of Pakistan (with the exception of FATA, GB and AJK regions). These data are not able to capture inter- and intra-district migration in Pakistan.

Second, we compliment the secondary information available with qualitative survey exercise. We make use of a household-level survey conducted by Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in 2014. The
survey included responses from households who had migrated from other communities due to various reasons. The survey covered 800 households across Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh. Districts in the sample included Quetta (100), Peshawar (100), Faisalabad (200), Multan (100), Sukkur (100) and Karachi (200).

Third, the context analysis for this study could not have been completed without undertaking KIIs and FGDs with a cross-section of communities, tribal elders and government officials. Therefore, three FGDs were conducted while KIIs were held with 10 key informants in each province.

A key feature of this survey is that it was conducted at the peak of localised conflicts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, FATA and Karachi. Therefore, the information provides some details on migrant’s motivation to move under times of prolonged conflicts. Additionally, districts such as Sukkur had received displaced communities during the floods of 2011. This phenomenon and how these migrants were able to become part of a new community have also been captured.

We chose these districts partly because they are major commercial centres in their respective provinces. In order to have a broader perspective, it was important to maintain a balance between urban and rural areas, since perceptions can considerably vary across the two settings. One limitation of this sample is that the random selection of migrant households did not specifically target any groups, such as women or minorities.

For the purpose of this study, we consider permanent migration that is internal (within national borders). The study does not consider the large quantum of immigrants who have been forcibly displaced (such as Afghan refugees), nor does it capture the large flows of international migrants who chose to move out of Pakistan.

**Internal migration in Pakistan**

Making use of LFS in 2013 and 2014, we demonstrate some static patterns of internal migration. From the data available for the year 2013–2014 (Table 12.2), we observe that if we exclude the mobility attributed to marriage, moving with parents or spouse, the key reason for migration was search for a job (5.62%). This number corresponds to those who are currently unemployed. We have 4.9 per cent who are employed or managed to find a new job, therefore had to move their location. Similarly for 3 per cent, it was on-the-job intercity transfer that led to migration.

If one looks at the gender comparison, the job-related mobility is minimal for women. For example, in 2013–2014, only 0.11 per cent moved in
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Main Reason for Migration</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Areas</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job transfer</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Found a job</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Searching for a job</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Searching for a better agriculture land</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>Business</td>
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<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>31.75</td>
<td>18.05</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>14.45</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>14.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Parents</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Spouse</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>11.94</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Son/daughter</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With change of residence</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to his home</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.35</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12.2 Percentage distribution of migrant population 10 years of age and over, 2014

search for a job, 0.31 per cent moved because they found a new job and 0.42 per cent had an on-the-job transfer.

The low growth years (2007–2012) also represent subdued migration for self-employment. The data suggest that only 1.6 per cent had migrated for business reasons, out of which the share of women entrepreneurs was only 0.06 per cent.

Internal migration may have been due to other reasons which have not been part of the survey administered by Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. For example, the data are silent on climate change-led migration (if any). However, we do see a substantial proportion mentioned under ‘other reasons’, ‘change of residence’, ‘search of better agriculture land’, some of which may be due to pressures imposed by flooding, droughts, changing cropping patterns and other climate change-led factors.

Similarly, as the data did not include FATA, where major displacements have taken place due to the ongoing war against terrorism, therefore the proportion of migrants who cited the reason as ‘security/law and order situation’ seems an underestimation. This is picked up in provincial disaggregation, where one observes that almost 3.2 per cent people in Khyber Pakhunkhwa had to move due to a poor law and order situation.

The same figure for Balochistan is much higher at almost 4 per cent. However, in the case of Balochistan, given the increase in public investment for infrastructure, there has been a major increase in government workforce. This is also captured in the data where, for Balochistan, almost 8 per cent migrants have cited that they had to move as they were able to find a job in 2013–2014. Similarly, in the case of self-employment, almost 9 per cent cited that they were able to open a business which was the main reason for their migration. We observe from existing literature that a vibrant private sector (where available) acts as a buffer for saving jobs in times of conflict. For example, Khan and Ahmed (2014) discuss this in the case of Pakistan.

How has the pattern of labour mobility changed in recent past? We observe from data on 2012–2013 that the proportion of those migrating due to job-related search was much higher (6.34%) if compared with 2013–2014. As economic growth was only starting to pick, therefore, self-employment opportunities were also relatively lesser than current times. Those who migrated for business concerns were 1.4 per cent. The rate of on-the-job transfer was also lower at 1.96 per cent. The year 2012–2013 also saw the annual unemployment rate cross above 6 per cent.

The LFS provides distribution of migrants by employment status and number of hours worked. This information indicates that a significant
number (15.4%) of those who have migrated were actually 'contributing family workers'. This number was higher in 2012–2013 at 19 per cent.

The distribution of migrants by urban and rural regions shows that in 2013–2014, out of the total migrants, 68 per cent moved to urban areas while the rest are observed to have moved to rural locations. The move from rural to urban is seen almost across every province except Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where migrants destined for rural areas (5.9%) was slightly higher than urban areas (5.75%). This may have been due to the internally displaced persons now going back to their native places.

The above-mentioned quantitative analysis has its limitations. Deshingkar and Grimm (2004) explain that national surveys or even census are unable to capture part-time occupations, unregistered migrants, underestimation of mobility and rural–rural migration.

Findings from the field survey

Increased urbanisation is helping migration

The urban areas in Pakistan have greatly expanded during the recent past. Pakistan’s level of urbanisation is now the highest in South Asia, and its urban population will equal its rural population by 2030. The urban population now contributes about three-quarters of Pakistan’s GDP and almost all of the government’s revenue. Around 24 per cent of urban households live below the poverty line. As part of our survey, we were able to find linkages between increased urbanisation and rural to urban migration in Quetta, Faisalabad, Multan, Sukkur and Karachi. Only in the case of Peshawar, we could not observe this linkage. As other cities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa become more peaceful, the burden on Peshawar is slowly receding.

Poverty is the most common reason for migration

As also documented in Gazdar (2003), our respondents revealed that a key reason for outmigration was low and uncertain incomes. Rural incomes have been under stress due to less than the potential growth in agriculture sector, particularly the major crops. The representative from Farmers’ Association of Pakistan revealed that they are unable to get the market-based price from the consumers owing to institutional weaknesses, including a flawed support price mechanism for wheat and sugar-cane. Farmers in the Punjab province are facing uncertainty, given the arbitrary practices by the agriculture department and collusive practices by the middlemen.
Several of those who are forced to move have accumulated debt through informal sources. They understand that repayment will be difficult due to the uncertainties faced by the agriculture sector, and therefore move out of their areas and sector. They are then forced to take daily wage work (e.g. in construction sector), often at a level below their reservation wage (for previous employment year). A large informal sector in peri-urban and urban areas also allows for multiple occupations; however, this may only be a seasonal job.

The non-farm sector in rural areas has also seen declining incomes. Our team was informed that during the early 2000s, this sector saw some growth owing to a growing banking sector’s growth in consumer financing and increased lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for working capital. However, our respondents from Quetta and Peshawar revealed that such financing was no more available owing to lesser liquidity available with the banks and more stringent lending conditions, which could not be met by SMEs. The small-scale non-farm sector was also hit hard by the shortages of power and gas during 2010–2013.

Given the prolonged power load-shedding in rural areas, it was reported that diversification of income sources is becoming increasingly difficulty. This also impacts the incidence of poverty in the short term, as Akram et al. (2011) have found that dependence only on farm occupation is negatively related with household income. The same study, however, shows that ownership of livestock can augment asset holding of the poor and act as a buffer during difficult times.

Ali and Khan (2013) also explain that livestock sector’s growth may help in ensuring rural household food security. This view was endorsed during our interviews, where we were also revealed that given the physically confined roles of women due to societal norms in the rural areas, livestock sector is greatly helped by the work done by rural women. While men may be more mobile in terms of leaving their physical space and going elsewhere for work, women somehow cannot move with similar ease. This partially can also be explained by the children’s upbringing for which one of the parents has to stay back. Under these circumstances, the proceeds from livestock can help the women survive short-term economic shocks.

**Weak urban governance affecting quality of life**

The challenge for the existing and emerging cities is that they lack the necessary financial, human and social resources to accommodate new migrants. According to the official data, the average population growth
rate in the cities (in our sample) is 1.9 per cent. Half of the annual average labour force growth finds its way into cities. While many reported that they had support systems in the form of family members or friends from native town, it is the poor migrants who are particularly vulnerable. Those with low-income levels, in our sample, reported how they could not access basic utility services like clean drinking water (provided by municipality), power supply and gas during the winter season.

During our interviews, utility services providers informed us that they were unable to meet even their recurrent costs and repeatedly resorted to the provincial finance department to cover operational losses. It is important to mention here that independent regulatory authorities, which in theory, are responsible for setting of fair and transparent user chargers are usually not strong to ensure the provision of these basic services. The planning departments at the municipal corporations have a weak research, monitoring and evaluation capacity. While they do have some arbitrary mechanism to forecast the demand for basic services by registered persons, they are unable to capture the inflow of many who are now the settlers in their jurisdiction.

The low- and middle-income group of migrants is also unable to compete for scarce housing supply in the urban areas. There are obsolete building regulations that stifle the growth of housing sector in cities. Such regulations also force the real estate prices to artificially spike upwards. The outdated rental laws have led to encroachments and evolution of a land grabbing syndicate, due to which landlords are now fearing to offer properties on rent. This particularly impacts the poor segment as for them not having shelter implies exclusion from cities. Lack of microcredit and mortgage financing limits the ability of low-income group to participate in the housing and commercial sector, which in turn implies an expansion in slum settlements. This exclusion has resulted in social evils, where one readily sees rising crime rates in Karachi, Faisalabad, Peshawar and Multan.

The weak sewerage and water supply transmission has costs for human health. One of the officials representing the government of Sindh informed our team that over 60 per cent of diseases in urban Sindh can be attributed to contaminated water supply, which in turn imposes a burden in the form of increased health expenditure by the provincial government. With a deregulated health sector, we understand that higher income groups within the urban areas are able to access private medical facilities. However, this has not reduced the burden on publically provided units which see an increasing flow of patients every year. Our respondents informed that the hospitals in Karachi and Peshawar are under extraordinary stress due to the rise in internally displaced persons.
A final aspect in the quality of life argument is that our respondents complained of parallel education systems having large variation in their quality. There is no mechanism for migrants belonging to low- and middle-income groups to admit their children readily to any form of public schooling. It takes a substantial amount of time to prepare documentation related to residential entitlements before these children can be admitted to public schools. Many felt that due to the significant transaction costs of obtaining necessary household registration, children from low-income groups end up missing several months and, in some cases, several years of education.9

Labour markets are not inclusive

The labour markets in the cities, though relatively better regulated than rural areas, lack necessary information mechanisms which can be utilised by the migrants. The segment in our sample which approached urban areas in search of better opportunities were usually relying on information sources provided to them by their family members, friends, colleagues or other informal contacts. This imperfect arrangement strengthens information asymmetries, which in turn reinforce labour market inequalities (for a formal explanation, see Kar and Saha 2011).

During our FGDs, we were informed of exploitation from employers, particularly in times of rising inflow from rural areas. Such exploitation was, however, limited to semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The skilled migrants were able to negotiate and communicate better with their employers and peers. Without going into an extensive literature around exploitation, we can take lead from Malik et al. (2011) to explain that one of the key reasons for this situation is that the labour unions have weakened over time. Those who were members of these unions have remained unable to cultivate a sense of ownership for new members, most of whom are settlers from outside.

During our FGD, it was informed that the labour departments at provincial levels are responsible for reporting any unjust behaviour at industrial level. However, given the weak inspection mechanism at these departments, there is a lack of documentation of such instances, including any accidents faced by the labour community. According to PILER (2014), the only source of reporting such accidents is the media, and even such reporting is not on a regular basis.

While there are dedicated labour courts in Pakistan, however, according to a respondent, these courts have: (a) clear disconnect with on-ground employer-employee relations, (b) large backlog of pending cases,
(c) inadequate number of judges handling pending and current cases and
d) overlapping jurisdiction between federal and provincial governments,
as after the 18th Amendment, several provinces have yet to enact their
provincial labour laws.\textsuperscript{10}

The two main labour welfare institutions in the country, that is, Employees Old-age Benefits Institution (EOBI) and Workers Welfare Fund (run through employer's contribution from net profits), have also been surrounded by controversy. At least two representatives from employer groups allegedly reported that there was credible information that a large sum of money was embezzled, and the federal government at one point had used this accumulated sum to finance their fiscal deficit. Here, again after the 18th Amendment, there is a turf war between the provincial and federal governments. The federal government is reluctant to devolve the administration of these institutions to the provinces, citing weak capacity in smaller provinces. The matter has yet to be decided in the Council of Common Interest.\textsuperscript{11}

Labour mobility can be greatly helped if there are institutions that can quickly build skills capacity and provide mentoring to the migrants. More skilled workers find it easier to migrate and find new and multiple opportunities (Ahmed and Sirageldin 1993). It was, however, observed during our interviews that there is a need to align curriculum at technical and vocational education and training institutions with current market demand inside and outside the country. The unskilled labour, usually not having formal education, cannot access some of the training material, as it is not translated into a language which is easier for them to comprehend. There are weak outreach campaigns to explain to the newcomers how such institutions can help them.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Rural-rural migration}

While most of the cities, where we administered the survey, could easily account as fully urbanised areas, however, instances of rural-rural migration were reported in Multan and Sukkur. This is, perhaps, the only encounter during this survey where some respondents also mentioned that evolving climatic conditions have forced them to change their residence. Such conditions included: (a) changing land use patterns, (b) lack of water for irrigation purposes, (c) moving to new locations where water and other agricultural inputs could be accessed, (d) drought and (c) recurrent flooding.

The above-mentioned updates our information from Gazdar (2003), who points out that rural-rural migration, although in small numbers,
takes place due to: (a) displacement of rural population due to public sector’s large-scale infrastructure projects, (b) agriculture migration from arid to irrigated areas, (c) agriculture share—tenants moving to find new tenancies, (d) communities moving with livestock in search of grazing and also to bring livestock to markets and (e) seasonal migration to and between rural areas during harvest period. The population undertaking rural—rural migration is usually from the bottom income quintiles, as observed during our discussions. They lack social networks which can help them move away from the areas of origin.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

A shallow understanding and lack of research on internal migration has left a knowledge void that presents barriers to meaningful policymaking and decision—making. Given Pakistan’s large and growing population, concerted investments in human security and development can help strengthen and expand productive capacities of employable workforce.

Given the lack of recent population census data, we do not know the precise motivation of people moving across rural—urban, rural—rural, urban—rural and urban—urban spaces. There is some evidence available from LFS and Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey. Such quantitative evidence has been explained as part of this chapter.

We analyse that:

- Despite lack of data and definition issues, there is credible information that a significant number of people are moving (internally) across the country.
- They are primarily motivated by income opportunities, security of household and assets.
- They require support mechanisms to deal with labour market inefficiencies in urban areas.
- Rural—rural migration is usually undertaken by the poorest of the poor. They require targeted social safety nets.

Based on the above—mentioned findings and desired response discussed during our FGDs and KII s following are the key policy recommendations:

i Monitoring of internal migration: The dearth of adequate data on internal migration presents a barrier to informed decision—making. Pakistan needs to establish a National Registration System that can capture data on population mobility across the country (and abroad).
This will need to be legislatively supported by making registration mandatory for all persons moving from one administrative boundary (such as tehsil) to another. This will provide much needed information to the government on flow and intensity of rural-urban migration to large cities.

ii **Economic contribution of internal migrants:** It is important to estimate the value of domestic remittances, so that internal migrants can be helped in their needs through targeted technical and vocational education training. Sectors in which migrants find it easy to adjust themselves can be scaled up during the medium to long term.

iii **Revisiting national policy:** There is a visible gap in the national policy on internal labour flows. The provisions under National Labour Policy (Government of Pakistan 2010) and National Emigration Policy (Government of Pakistan 2009) do not stand applicable after the 18th Amendment. The provincial governments have been slow to enact their own provincial laws. This has left a large number of labour community uninsured in the face of various hazards and instances of exploitation they face on a daily basis. Most semi-skilled and unskilled labour is not appropriately registered at destination due to the large transactions cost. The policies around EOBI and WWF also need to be updated. The matter has been pending with the Council of Common Interest since long.

iv **Managing urbanisation:** The unplanned urbanisation and expansion of mega cities has resulted in slum dwellings with increased health hazards. A viable solution to overcome this challenge is to develop intermediate cities or towns (Jamal and Ashraf 2004), which can serve as pivots between large cities and rural areas by facilitating access to labour markets (Hussain 2014). This, however, is only a longer term solution. For the short term, it is recommended that health-related social safety nets be put in place, particularly to protect women and children (of migrant populations) living in these areas.\(^{14}\)

v **Climate change and migration:** Given the recurrent floods in the country and instances of drought, it is important to develop adaptive capacities of population in rural areas. Temporary internal migration can act as a short-term adaptation strategy. However, before migrating, this population requires support in disaster preparedness. After migration, this population will require support in temporary residential settlement and income generating activities.

vi **Strengthening social accountability mechanisms:** The government and development partners should together strengthen capacities of local-level non-governmental organisations that can help in social
mobilisation and self-help initiatives aimed towards those who are forced to migrate and settle into a new place. Instruments, such as ‘right to information’, citizens’ feedback on basic services and more, can help public sector’s efficiency and internal migration.

Notes

1 According to International Organisation for Migration, ‘With the SDGs, migration has for the first time been inserted into mainstream development policy. The situation of migrant workers is highlighted in SDG 8 on economic growth and decent work. The issue of trafficking is mentioned in several SDGs for instance SDG 16 on peaceful societies and migration status is mentioned specifically as a factor for disaggregation during the follow-up and review in SDG 17. Among all targets, SDG target 10.7 is the center-piece for migration in the 2030 Agenda. It calls for “well-managed migration policies”, and hence encompasses all aspects of migration’. Weblink: http://ow.ly/YM5pM (accessed on 26 February 2016).
2 Average annual real GDP growth remained below 4 per cent during this period.
3 The provincial tables have not been exhibited here due to space limitation. These can be accessed from http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/labour-force-statistics
5 Previously, there was a support price for rice as well.
6 For details on how energy crisis impacted the economy, see Ahmed (2013).
7 Since 2010, the average annual growth rate of labour force is 1.2 per cent. The average annual growth rate of employed labour force for the same period is 1.1 per cent.
8 The more recent military operation was launched in North Waziristan in June 2014. According to some estimates, a population of approximately one million is currently displaced in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
9 In the case of religious minorities, weak laws around legal entitlements can result in further delays.
10 The 18th Constitutional Amendment, among other changes, provides provincial governments a greater autonomy by abolishing the concurrent list.
11 For details on desired operational reforms at workers welfare fund, see Ahmed et al. (2013).
12 This is in line with findings from Ansari and Wu (2013).
13 Last available census information is from 1998.
14 Given a large population of children involved in the internal migration processes, such social safety nets may not be limited to health. For an example of female child education support programme, see Ahmed and Zeshan (2014).

References


South Asians comprise over 15 per cent of all international migrating population, among the highest in the world. The countries of the Persian Gulf are perhaps still the largest recipients of migrant workers. A unique economy has developed between these two regions, with all South Asian nations being major beneficiaries and featuring among the top twenty countries receiving maximum remittances globally.

The South Asia Migration Report 2017 is the first of its kind, documenting migration profiles, diaspora, recruitment and remittances, both in individual countries as well as the South Asian region as a whole. It also discusses skilled, unskilled and internal migrations.

The volume:

- includes on-the-ground studies from six nations: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Afghanistan;
- discusses public policy, effects of global recession on the region and its impact on migration; and
- examines the process of reintegration of returning migrants.

This book will be indispensable for scholars and researchers of economics, development studies, migration and diaspora studies, labour studies and sociology. It will also be useful to policymakers and government institutions working in the area.

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